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Abstract
This paper studies static state estimation in multi-sensor settings, with a caveat that an unknown
subset of the sensors are compromised by an adversary, whose measurements can be manipulated
arbitrarily. The attacker is able to compromise q out of m sensors. A new performance metric, which
quantifies the asymptotic decay rate for the probability of having an estimation error larger than δ, is
proposed. We develop an optimal estimator for the new performance metric with a fixed δ, which is
the Chebyshev center of a union of ellipsoids. We further provide an estimator that is optimal for every
δ, for the special case where the sensors are homogeneous. Numerical examples are given to elaborate
the results.
Index Terms
Security, Secure estimation, Byzantine attacks, Large deviation
I. INTRODUCTION
In cyber-physical systems, numerous sensors with limited capacity are spatially deployed
and connected via ubiquitous wired and wireless communication networks. This makes it nearly
impossible to guarantee the security of every single sensor or communication channel. Therefore,
security problems of cyber-physical systems have attracted much attention recently, e.g., [1], [2].
Robust estimation has been studied over decades to deal with uncertainties of input data [3]–
[5]. The robustness is usually measured by influence functions or breakdown point, and several
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2celebrated estimators have been developed, such as M-, L-, and R-estimators. The limitation of
this robustness theory is the assumption that the bad data are independent [5], which, however, is
not the case in general for cyber attacks. The fact that compromised sensors may cooperate and
the estimation is done sequentially makes the “bad” data correlated both spatially and temporarily.
Recently, dynamic state estimation with some Byzantine sensors has been discussed. Most
approaches in the existing literature can be classified into two categories: stacked measure-
ments [6]–[8] and Kalman filter decomposition [9], [10]. Fawzi et al. [6] used the stacked
measurements from time k to k + T − 1 to estimate the state at time k and provided l0 and
l1-based state estimation procedures. Since deterministic systems are concerned, the l0-based
procedure can exactly recover the state. Pajic et al. [7] extended the deterministic systems in [6]
to ones with bounded measurement noises and obtained upper bounds of estimation error for both
l0 and l1-based estimators. Mishar et al. [8] studied stochastic systems with unbounded noises
and proposed a notion of ǫ-effective attack. The state estimation there is in essence an attack
detection problem; a Chi-squared test is applied to the residues and the standard Kalman filter
output based on the measurements from the largest set of sensors that are deemed ǫ-effective
attack-free is used as the state estimate. Notice that to detect the ǫ-effective attack-free sensors
correctly with high probability, the window size T must be large enough. The authors did not
provide estimators before detection decisions are made. The authors of [9], [10] used local
estimators at each sensor and proposed a LASSO based fusion scheme. However, their approach
imposes some strong constraints on the system dynamics. Furthermore, the estimate error of the
proposed algorithm when there are indeed attacks is not specifically characterized.
In this paper, we deal with scenarios where noises are not necessarily bounded and give a
different characterization of the estimator performance, i.e., the decaying rate of the worst-case
probability that the estimation error is larger than some value δ rather than the worst-case error
in [7], [9], [10] and estimation error covariance in [8]. This is partially motivated by the following
three observations. Firstly, with unbounded noise, the worst-case estimation error might result
in too conservative system designs. Notice also that even for the bounded noise cases studied
in [7], the upper bound of the worst-case estimation error thereof increases with respect to
(w.r.t.) the window size T , which counters intuition since more information should lead to better
estimation accuracy. Secondly, to mitigate the bad effects caused by Byzantine sensors, one has
to accumulate much enough information, i.e., the time window T should be large enough. In
this case, the decaying rate is able to characterize the probability well enough (just as, e.g., [8]).
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3Lastly, the system operator may pre-define the error threshold δ according to the performance
specification, which leads to a more flexible system design.
In the subsequent sections, we focus on the problem of secure static state estimation with
Byzantine sensors. A fusion center aims to estimate a vector state x ∈ Rn from measurements
collected by m sensors, among which q sensors might be compromised. Without imposing any
restrictions on the attacker’s capabilities, we assume that the compromised sensors can send
arbitrary messages. Static state estimation has a wide range of applications in power system,
where the power network states (i.e., bus voltage phase angles and bus voltage magnitudes) are
estimated from measurements collected by Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems (e.g., transmission line power flows, bus power injections, and part of the bus voltages)
through remote terminal units (RTUs) [11], [12]. Considering the possibility that the RTUs
are controlled and the communicated data from SCADA systems tampered with by malicious
attackers, much work has devoted to security problems of power systems, e.g. [13]–[16]. The
closest literature is [17], [18], which, however, both focused on the one-shot scenario, while in
this work the observations are taken sequentially, the possible temporal correlations of which
make the analysis more challenging. We should also note that both [17], [18] used the worst-
case estimate error as the performance metric rather than the probabilistic approach in this
paper. Moreover, the main results of this work provide fundamental insights on the counterpart
for dynamical systems that we are still investigating.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
1) We propose a new metric to characterize the performance of an estimator when observation
noise is not necessarily bounded and an attacker may be present.
2) We provide an optimal estimator for a given estimation error threshold δ (Theorem 2),
which is the Chebyshev center of a union of ellipsoids. We then propose an algorithm to
compute the optimal estimator (Algorithm 1 and Theorem 3).
3) When the sensors are homogeneous, we further provide a uniformly optimal estimator,
i.e., simultaneously optimal for any error threshold δ (Theorem 4). The estimator is just
the “trimmed mean” of the averaged observations.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented in [19]. The main difference is threefold.
Firstly, new results have been provided in this paper, i.e., numerical implementation of our
algorithm (Section III-C) and uniformly optimal estimator design (Section IV). Secondly, in [19],
only proofs of Lemmas 8 and 9 were presented due to page limitation. Lastly, new simulations
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4have been conducted in this paper for better illustration.
Organization: In Section II, we formulate the problem of static state estimation with Byzantine
sensors, including the attack model and performance metric. The main results are presented in
Section III. We first prove that one may only consider estimators with certain “nice” structures.
Based on this, we then provide an optimal estimator for a given error threshold and propose an
algorithm to compute the optimal estimator. Furthermore, a very simple yet uniformly optimal
estimator when sensors are homogeneous is provided in Section IV. After showing numerical
examples in Section V, we conclude the paper in Section VI. All proofs are reported in the
appendix.
Notations: R (R+) is the set of (nonnegative) real numbers. N (N+) is the set of nonnegative
(positive) integers. For a vector x ∈ Rn, define ‖x‖0 as the “zero norm”, i.e., the number of
nonzero elements of the vector x. For a vector x ∈ Rn, the support of x, denoted by supp(x),
is the set of indices of nonzero elements:
supp(x) , {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : xi 6= 0}.
Define 1 as the column vector of ones and the size clear from the context if without further
notice. Let In be the identity matrix of size n × n. For a matrix M ∈ Rm×n, unless stated
otherwise,Mi represents the i-th row, and MI the matrix obtained from M after removing all
of the rows except those in the index set I. For a set of matrices A ⊆ Rm×n, we use AI to
denote the set of matrices keeping rows indexed by I, i.e.,
AI , {MI :M ∈ A}.
For a set A, define the indicator function as 1A(x) = 1, if x ∈ A; 0 otherwise. The cardinality
of a set A is denoted as |A|. LetM⊤ denote the transpose of the matrixM . We writeM <N
if M −N is a positive semi-definite matrix.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
Consider the problem of estimating the state x ∈ Rn usingm sensor measurements as depicted
in Fig. 1. Let M , {1, . . . , m} be the index set of all the sensors. The measurement equation
for sensor i ∈M is
zi(k) = Hix+ wi(k),
January 17, 2020 DRAFT
5where zi(k) ∈ R is the (“true”) measurement collected by the sensor i at time k ∈ N+,Hi ∈ R
1×n
is the output matrix associated with sensor i, wi(k) ∈ R is the observation noise. It is assumed that
wi(k) is Gaussian distributed with zero mean and variance E[(wi(k))
2] = Wi > 0 for any i, k
1.
Furthermore, wi(k) are independent across the sensors and over time, i.e., E[wi1(k1)wi2(k2)] = 0
if i1 6= i2 or k1 6= k2.
In the presence of attacks, the measurement received by the fusion center is yi(k), with satisfies
the following equation:
yi(k) = zi(k) + ai(k),
where ai(k) ∈ R is the bias injected by the attacker.
sm
s1
x FC
xˆ
zm(k)
z1(k)
ym(k)
y1(k)
Fig. 1: The fusion center (FC) estimates the underlying state x using sensor measurements that
might be manipulated.
We assume the attacks are q-sparse:
Assumption 1 (q-sparse attack). There exists an index set C ⊆M such that
1) for any sensor i ∈M \ C, ai(k) = 0 for any time k.
2) |C| = q.
The sparse attack model, which is conventional in the literature [6]–[10], [18], [20], [21], says
that the set of compromised sensors is somewhat “constant” over time. This is in essence the only
restriction we impose on the attacker’s capability. The bias ai(k) of a compromised sensor may
take any value and might be correlated across sensors and over time. If the set of compromised
1Actually, the main results in this paper hold for any noise distribution in the exponential family; the details are discussed in
Remark 2
January 17, 2020 DRAFT
6sensors is time-varying, the estimators (or detectors) in all the aforementioned literature will
be destroyed. That is, the estimators (or detectors) could not work at all or the error could be
arbitrarily large. In this paper, without this constant property, even Lemma 1 provided later (in
particular, e.g., (34) and (35)), which is the basis for Theorems 1 and 2, would not hold.
Assumption 2 (System knowledge). The system designer knows the number q, but does not
know the exact set of compromised sensors C.
The quantity q might be determined by the a priori knowledge about the quality of each
sensor. Alternatively, the quantity q may be viewed as a design parameter, which indicates the
resilience level that the designer is willing to pay for. One finds more comments about the above
assumption in Remark 3.
Let H = [H⊤1 , H
⊤
2 , . . . , H
⊤
m]
⊤ be the measurement matrix. We assume that the matrix H is
2q-observable:
Assumption 3. The measurement matrix H is 2q-observable, i.e., for every set I ⊆ M with
|I| = m− 2q, the matrix HI is of full column rank.
It has been shown in [6] that 2q-observability of the measurement matrix is a necessary and
sufficient condition to recover the exact state under q-sparse attacks when there are no observation
noises. One finds the results if Assumption 3 is violated in Lemma 3 later. Notice that in power
systems, measurement redundancy is a common practice [12].
To introduce the knowledge available at the attacker, we need the following definitions. Define
the measurement from all sensors at time k to be a column vector:
y(k) ,
[
y1(k) y2(k) . . . ym(k)
]⊤
∈ Rm. (1)
We further define Y (k) as a matrix of all measurements from time 1 to time k:
Y (k) ,
[
y(1) y(2) . . . y(k)
]
∈ Rm×k. (2)
The quantities a(k),A(k) are defined in the same manner. At time k, given measurements from
all the sensors Y (k), the fusion center generates a state estimate xˆk. The estimator f might be
random, i.e., given Y (k), xˆk is a random variable governed by certain probability measure on
R
n determined by f .
Assumption 4 (Attacker’s knowledge). It is assumed that
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71) the attacker knows the true state x;
2) the attacker knows the estimator f , the system parameters (i.e., each Hi and Wi), and can
access the historical and current observations from the compromised sensors.
The above assumption as a whole has been adopted in literature on sparse attack, e.g., [20]–
[22], while the second bullet prevails in literature on data-injection attack, e.g., [8], [13], [23].
The parameters Hi and Wi might be developed by an attacker using the a priori knowledge of
the underlying physical model. To obtain the true state, the attacker may deploy its own sensor
network. Though it might be difficult in practice to obtain the accurate parameters and true state
for an attacker, this assumption is de facto when dealing with potential worst-case attacks. We
should note that this assumption is in accordance with the Kerckhoffs’s principle [24], namely
the security of a system should not rely on its obscurity. Interested readers are referred to [25] to
see more attack models in cyber-physical systems. This assumption is leveraged later to define
the performance metric in (3) and characterize the attack capacity in Theorems 1 and 2. In
particular, one finds more on how Assumptions 1 and 4 are utilized to derive (34) in Remark 6
later.
B. Performance Metric
At time k, given the measurements Y (k)C , the bias A(k−1), the set of compromised sensors
C, and true state x, the bias a(k) is generated according to some probability measure on Rm.
This bias injection mechanism is denoted by g. Let G be the set of all attack strategies such that
the generated bias a(k) satisfies the q-sparse attack model in Assumption 1.
In this paper, we are concerned with the worst-case scenario. Given an estimator f , we define
e(f, k, δ) , sup
C⊆M,g∈G,x∈Rn
Pf,g,x,C (‖xˆk − x‖2 > δ) (3)
as the worst-case probability that the distance between the estimate at time k and the true
state is larger than a certain value δ ∈ R+ considering all possible attack strategies, the set
of compromised sensors and the true state. We use Pf,g,x,C to denote the probability measure
governing xˆk when the estimator f , attack strategy g, the true state x, and the set of compromised
sensors C are given.
Ideally, one wants to design an estimator f such that e(f, k, δ) is minimized at any time
k for any δ. However, it is quite difficult to analyze e(f, k, δ) when k takes finite values
since computing the probability of error usually involves numerical integration. Therefore, we
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8consider an asymptotic estimation performance, i.e., the exponential rate with which the worst-
case probability goes to zero:
r(f, δ) , lim inf
k→∞
−
log e(f, k, δ)
k
. (4)
Obviously, for any δ, the system designer would like to maximize r(f, δ) by choosing a suitable
estimator f .
The threshold δ is chosen by the designer in accordance with system accuracy requirement
by noticing that a true state x is perceived as the same with any point x′ lying inside its
neighbourhood, i.e., ‖x′−x‖2 ≤ δ by the above performance metric. However, in some cases (see
Section IV), there is no need to determine δ since one can find an estimator that simultaneously
maximizes r(f, δ) for all δ.
C. Problems of Interest
The following three problems are to be addressed.
1) Performance limit. For any δ, what is the maximal rate r(f, δ) that can be achieved by all
possible estimators?
2) Optimal estimator. Given δ, what is the optimal estimator that maximizes r(f, δ)?
3) Uniform optimality. Is there an estimator that simultaneously maximizes r(f, δ) for all
δ > 0?
III. OPTIMAL ESTIMATOR
In this section, the first two problems in Section II-C shall be addressed. We provide an
estimator based on Chebyshev centers, prove its optimality, and further present a numerical
algorithm to implement it.
A. Compressed and Deterministic Estimator
A generic estimator fk might randomly generate an estimate xˆk based on all the information
contained in Y (k). In other words, given Y (k), the estimate xˆk might be a random variable;
and if any element (totally there are m× k) of two observation matrices, say Y (k) and Y ′(k),
is different, the corresponding probability distributions of the estimate xˆk might be different. In
this subsection, however, we shall show that, without loss of optimality, one may only consider
January 17, 2020 DRAFT
9estimators with certain “nice” structure (i.e., the compressed and deterministic estimators defined
in Definition 3 later).
Define an operator avg(·) that averages each row of the inputed real-valued matrix, i.e., for
any matrix M ∈ Rn1×n2 ,
avg(M) ,M1/n2.
Hence, avg(Y (k)) is a vector in Rm and the i-th element is the empirical mean of the observation
from time 1 to k available for sensor i.
We use Pf(xˆk|Y (k)) to denote the conditional probability measure of estimate xˆk given any
estimator f and the information Y (k). Notice that an estimator f can be completely characterized
by the sequence of conditional probability measures from time 1 to∞: (Pf(xˆ1|Y (1)),Pf(xˆ2|Y (2)), . . .).
Definition 1. An estimator f is said to be compressed if at each time k, it only utilizes
the averaged information avg(Y (k)) to generate estimate xˆk, i.e., the conditional probability
measures satisfy
Pf(xˆk ∈ A|Y (k)) = Pf(xˆk ∈ A|Y
′(k)) (5)
for any Borel set A ⊆ Rn whenever avg(Y (k)) = avg(Y ′(k)).
Let F (Fc, resp.) be the set of all possible (compressed, resp.) estimators. In the following
lemma, we show that it suffices to consider an estimator in Fc.
Lemma 1. For any estimator f ∈ F , there exists another compressed estimator f ′ ∈ Fc such
that for all δ > 0,
e(f ′, k, δ) ≤ e(f, k, δ), k = 1, 2, . . .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. Intuitively, only measurements from benign sensors provide “useful information”
needed to estimate the underlying state, while under the most harmful attack, compromised
sensors will merely generate disturbing noises. In our case, the averaged information avg(Y(k))
can fully summarize the information contained in measurements from benign sensors due to
the fact that avg(Y(k)) is a sufficient statistic for the underlying state x when there is no
attacker. Therefore, it suffices to consider a compressed estimator that only utilizes the averaged
information each time. This might be counterintuitive as one expects that with more information,
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i.e., using raw data Y(k), the compromised sensors could be detected more easily and, thus,
better performance could be achieved. This, however, is not the case.
Remark 2. Lemma 1 says that avg(Y(k)) is a sufficient statistic for the underlying state x
whether or not the attacker is present. In fact, one may verify, using the same idea in Appendix A,
in particular, the construction technique in (30), that Lemma 1 holds if the distribution of wi(k)
is in the exponential family and not necessarily Gaussian as we assume. This is mainly due to the
fact that, if the distribution of a one-shot observation is in the exponential family, the sufficient
statistic of a set of i.i.d. observations is simply the sum of individual sufficient statistics, the size
of which will not increase as data accumulate.
In the following, we refine the set F from another perspective.
Definition 2. An estimator f is said to be deterministic w.r.t Y (k) if for every time k and
observations Y (k), the estimate f(Y (k)) is a single point in Rn.
Let Fd be the set of all estimators that are deterministic w.r.t. Y (k). Then similar to the above
lemma we have
Lemma 2. For any estimator f ∈ F , there exists another deterministic one f ′ ∈ Fd such that
for all δ > 0
r(f ′, δ) ≥ r(f, δ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on the above two lemmas, we further refine F .
Definition 3. An estimator f is said to be compressed and deterministic if it is deterministic
w.r.t. avg(Y (k)), i.e., there exists a sequences of functions {f˜k}k=1,2,... with f˜k : Rm → Rn such
that the estimate at each time k
f(Y (k)) = f˜k(avg(Y (k))).
Let Fcd be the set of all compressed and deterministic estimators. Obviously, Fcd ⊆ Fc,Fcd ⊆
Fd. In the following theorem, we show that instead of F , one may only consider the set Fcd
for our problem.
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Theorem 1. For any estimator f ∈ F , there exists another compressed and deterministic
estimator f ′ ∈ Fcd such that
r(f ′, δ) ≥ r(f, δ), ∀δ > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
B. Optimal Estimator Based on Chebyshev Centers
In this subsection, we propose an optimal compressed and deterministic estimator. To this end,
we need the following definitions: The distance of a point x0 ∈ R
n to a bounded and non-empty
set A ⊆ Rn is defined as
dist(x0,A) , sup{‖x− x0‖2 : x ∈ A}.
Moreover, the set’s radius rad(A) ∈ R+ and Chebyshev center chv(A) ∈ Rn are defined by
rad(A) , min
x0∈Rn
dist(x0,A), (6)
chv(A) , arg min
x0∈Rn
dist(x0,A). (7)
Notice that the Chebyshev center exists and is unique, since Rn is uniformly convex and A is
bounded [26, Part 5, §33].
Given y ∈ Rm, x ∈ Rn, define their inconsistency dx(y) as the optimal value of the following
optimization problem:
minimize
a ∈ Rm
1
2
m∑
i=1
(yi −Hix+ ai)
2/Wi
subject to ‖a‖0 ≤ q.
(8)
Further define the set X (y, φ), φ ≥ 0 as the set of x such that the inconsistency with y is upper
bounded by φ, i.e.,
X (y, φ) , {x ∈ Rn : dx(y) ≤ φ}. (9)
Given δ ≥ 0, define X(y, δ) as the biggest X (y, φ) of which the radius is upper bounded by δ:
X(y, δ) ,
⋃
rad(X (y,φ))≤δ, φ≥0
X (y, φ). (10)
It is easy to see that X (y, φ) is monotonically increasing w.r.t. φ. As a result, its radius is also
increasing. Notice also that given y, the radius rad(X (y, φ)) is right-continuous with respect to
φ (see details in Lemma 6 later). Therefore, it might happen that rad(X(y, δ)) < δ for certain δ,
January 17, 2020 DRAFT
12
while in most cases rad(X(y, δ)) = δ is achieved. Let f ∗δ be the estimator such that the estimate
at time k is the Chebyshev center of X(avg(Y (k)), δ), i.e.,
f ∗δ (Y (k)) = chv (X(avg(Y (k)), δ)) . (11)
For y ∈ Rm and δ > 0, we define u(y, δ) as the upper bound of the inconsistency between y
and the elements in X(y, δ):
u(y, δ) , sup
x∈X(y,δ)
dx(y). (12)
With a slight abuse of notation, we define u(δ) as the lower bound of u(y, δ):
u(δ) , inf
y∈Rm
u(y, δ). (13)
We have our first main result about the estimator (11).
Theorem 2. Given any δ > 0, the estimator f ∗δ in (11) is optimal in the sense that it maximizes
the rate (4), i.e., for any estimator f ∈ F ,
r(f, δ) ≤ r(f ∗δ , δ) = u(δ). (14)
Proof. See Appendix D.
Remark 3. Notice that our estimator involves q, as is the case in [8], where the estimator (i.e.,
Algorithm 2 thereof) depends on the perceived number of compromised sensors (or its upper
bound) as well. On the contrary, estimators in [6], [9] do not. In practice, the number of actually
compromised sensors, q0, might be smaller or larger than the design parameter q. If q0 < q, the
performance of our estimator is lower bounded by u(δ) in (13). The details are as follows. With
a little abuse of notation, in this remark, we use dx(y, q) (instead of dx(y)) to denote the optimal
value of optimization problem in (8), and rewrite r(f ∗δ , δ) as rq(f
∗
δ , δ). Then the performance of
our estimator when the number of compromised sensors is q0 < q is:
rq0(f
∗
δ , δ) = inf
y∈Rm
sup
x∈X(y,δ)
dx(y, q0) ≥ u(δ). (15)
We should admit that it is challenging to design an estimator that balances decently rq(f
∗
δ , δ)
and rq0(f
∗
δ , δ) in our case. Interested readers are referred to our previous work [21], where
an detector that achieves the “best” trade-off among performances with different q’s in the
binary hypothesis testing case was provided. While if q0 > q, our estimator will be destroyed,
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i.e., r(f ∗δ , δ) = 0, as is the case in [8]. This is not desirable in practice. Our future work will
investigate estimators independent of q.
In the following lemma, we consider the case where Assumption 3 is violated.
Lemma 3. If Assumption 3 is violated, the followings holds:
1) For any δ > 0, there exists y∗, x1, x2 (dependent on δ) such that dx1(y
∗) = dx2(y
∗) = 0
and ‖x1 − x2‖2 > δ;
2) r(f, δ) = r(f ∗δ , δ) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix E
The above first bullet yields that for any δ > 0, there exists y (dependent on δ) such that
X(y, δ) is empty.
C. Numerical Implementation
In this subsection, we provide an algorithm to compute the estimator f ∗δ proposed above. We
shall first propose a method to compute the Chebyshev center and the radius of X (y, φ) for a
given φ. This shares a similar spirit with [27]. We then consider how to derive the appropriate
φ using a modified bisection method. To proceed, we need the following definition and lemmas.
A variation of dx(y), where the support of a in the definition in (8) is given a priori, is defined
as follows:
Definition 4. Given x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rm, and index set I ⊆M, the restricted inconsistency dx(y, I)
is
dx(y, I) ,
1
2
∑
i∈I
(yi −Hix)
2/Wi. (16)
It is clear that with a fixed set I, dx(y, I) is continuous w.r.t. both x and y. Furthermore,
dx(y) = min
I⊆M, |I|=m−q
dx(y, I).
Lemma 4. When |I| ≥ m−2q, the restricted inconsistency dx(y, I) can be equivalently written
as:
dx(y, I) = (x− κIyI)
⊤ var(I)(x− κIyI) + res(I) (17)
January 17, 2020 DRAFT
14
where the “variance”
var(I) =
1
2
H⊤IW
−1
{I}HI (18)
and the “residue”
res(I) =
1
2
(yI −HIκIyI)
⊤W−1{I}(yI −HIκIyI) (19)
withW{I} (different fromWI) being the square matrix obtained fromW = diag(W1,W2, . . . ,Wm)
after removing all of the rows and columns except those in the index set I, and
κI = (H
⊤
IW
−1
{I}HI)
−1H⊤IW
−1
{I}. (20)
Proof. See Appendix F.
In the following, we show that computing the Chebyshev center and radius of the set X (y, φ)
introduced in (9) can be transferred to a convex optimization problem. Notice that one can
rewrite X (y, φ) as:
X (y, φ) =
⋃
X (y, φ, I), (21)
where
X (y, φ, I) , {x ∈ Rn : dx(y, I) ≤ φ}.
In other words, X (y, φ) is a union of ellipsoids. It is worth pointing out that if res(I) = φ,
X (y, φ, I) degenerates to a single point; and if res(I) > φ, X (y, φ, I) is empty. Therefore, to
differentiate these cases, we define
I(φ) , {I ⊆M : res(I) ≤ φ and |I| = m− q}, (22)
I+(φ) , {I ⊆M : res(I) < φ and |I| = m− q},
I0(φ) , I(φ) \ I+(φ).
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Lemma 5. Given φ such that I(φ) is not empty. Consider the following semidefinite programming
problem:
minimize
τ∈R|I+(φ)|,c,ψ∈R
ψ
subject to ψ ≥ 0,
τi ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ |I+(φ)|,
τid(I)Θ(I, φ) < θ(c, ψ), ∀I ∈ I+(φ),
ψ (κIyI − c)⊤
∗ In

 < 0, ∀I ∈ I0(φ),
where
Θ(I, φ)
,


var(I) − var(I)κIyI 0
∗ (κIyI)⊤ var(I)κIyI + res(I)− φ 0
0 0 0


with ∗ being recovered by symmetry,
θ(c, ψ) ,


In −c 0
−c⊤ −ψ c⊤
0 c −In

 ,
and id(·) : I+(φ) 7→ {1, 2, . . . , |I+(φ)|} is any one-to-one function. Then
chv(X (y, φ)) = c∗, (23)
rad(X (y, φ)) =
√
ψ∗, (24)
where c∗ and ψ∗ are the optimal solution of the semidefinite programming problem.
Proof. See Appendix F.
It follows from this lemma that, finding the Chebyshev center and radius of the set X (y, φ) is
a semidefinite programming problem when y, φ are given. However, we are interested in finding
the optimal estimator that maximize the rate r(f, δ), for a given δ. In the following lemma, we
give how rad(X (y, φ)) varies with φ, the illustration of which is in Section V-A.
January 17, 2020 DRAFT
16
Lemma 6. Given any y ∈ Rm, the radius rad(X (y, φ)) have the following properties:
1) rad(X (y, φ)) is increasing, right-continuous w.r.t. φ.
2) If rad(X (y, φ)) is discontinuous at a point φ0, then there must exist a set I ⊆ M with
|I| = m− q such that res(I) = φ0.
3) When rad(X (y, φ)) > 0, rad(X (y, φ)) is strictly increasing w.r.t. φ.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Given a predefined approximation bound ε > 0, we compute the corresponding estimate xˆ
for an averaged measurement avg(Y (k)) ∈ Rm in Algorithm 1. Denoted by fˆε the resulting
estimator, and by fˆ(y, ε) the output of Algorithm 1 (i.e., the estimate xˆ) when the inputs are
y, ε.
Notice that Algorithm 1 is a slight variation of the classic bisection method. The distinguished
part lies in (25), which together with Lemma 6 assures that for any y ∈ Rm,
inf
x 6∈Bδ(fˆ(y,ε))
dx(y) ≥ u(y, δ)− ε,
where u(y, δ) is defined in (12). Therefore, the following theorem readily follows:
Theorem 3. Let an estimator fˆε(Y (k)) = fˆ(avg(Y (k)), ε) be computed by Algorithm 1 with
avg(Y (k) and ε > 0 as inputs, then for all δ > 0 this estimator possesses the guaranteed
performance:
r(fˆε, δ) ≥ r(f
∗
δ , δ)− ε,
where f ∗δ is the optimal estimator in (11)
Clearly, a smaller ε in Algorithm 1 leads to a better estimator, which, however, requires more
iterations to run.
Remark 4. Though semidefinite programming problem can be (approximately) solved in a poly-
nomial time of program size [28]. In our case, however, when φ is large enough, |I+(φ)| = (
m
q ),
where (mq ) is the binomial coefficient, which renders the optimization problem in Lemma 5 rather
computationally heavy when φ and m are large. Nevertheless, we defend our estimator from
the following two aspects. First, though efficient and optimal algorithms might exist in certain
problems, see e.g., [21], the resilient information fusion under sparse attack is intrinsically
of combinatorial nature, see e.g., [6], [8], [29], since we basically need to search over all
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Algorithm 1 Approximate Optimal Estimator f ∗δ in (11)
Inputs: averaged measurements y ∈ Rm,
performance error tolerance ε > 0.
Output: estimate xˆ ∈ Rn
Initialization: Let
φ = min{res(I) : I ⊆M, |I| = m− q}
, Υ,
and φ be such that rad(X (y, φ)) > δ.
Repeat:
1. If φ− φ < ε/2 then
φ = max{Υ, φ− ε/2}, (25)
xˆ = chv(X (y, φ))
Stop
EndIf
2. Let φ = (φ+ φ)/2.
3. If rad(X (y, φ)) = δ then
xˆ = chv(X (y, φ))
Stop
ElseIf rad(X (y, φ)) > δ then
φ = φ
Else φ = φ
EndIf
combinations of possibly healthy sensors. Nevertheless, this work is just a starting point, and we
are planning to investigate the approaches that could relieve the computational burden (in certain
cases) just as in [30]–[32]. Second, in practice, a small δ would be usually chosen. Then the size
of I+(φ) will be small as well no matter how bigm is, and, therefore, the optimization problem in
Lemma 5 could be efficiently solved. Though finding Υ of Algorithm 1 is of combinatorial nature,
computing res(I) (given in (19)) for a given set I is light (notice thatW{I} is a diagonal matrix
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and its inverse, therefore, is readily given). Therefore, the computation burden of Algorithm 1
could be tolerated for a large m.
Remark 5. The resilience of the proposed optimal estimator f ∗δ in (11) may not be that apparent
since Chebyshev center itself is sensitive to noises, i.e., the Chebyshev center of a set A can
be driven to anywhere even if only one point of A is allowed to be manipulated. Nevertheless,
the resilience of the estimator f ∗δ can be heuristically explained by the following two factors.
First, when the time k is large enough, the measurements from benign sensors can lead to rather
accurate estimate, i.e., the res(I∗) will be quite small, where I∗ is of size m − q and contains
no compromised sensors. Therefore, I∗ would be in the collection I(φ) defined in (22) and
somehow serves as an anchor when computing the estimate as in Algorithm 1 and Lemma 5.
Second, when the injected bias of a compromised sensor is too large, the resulting res(I) for any
I containing this compromised sensor will be quite large as well. Therefore, the set I will not
be in the collection I(φ) and the measurement from this compromised sensor will be discarded
when computing the estimate.
IV. UNIFORMLY OPTIMAL ESTIMATOR FOR HOMOGENEOUS SENSORS
In this section we provide a simple yet uniformly optimal estimator f such that r(f, δ) is
simultaneously maximized for all δ > 0 when the sensors are homogeneous, i.e., H1 = · · · = Hm
and W1 = · · · = Wm. Notice that when homogeneous sensors are considered, to satisfy the 2q-
observable assumption in Assumption 3, the state has to be scalar, i.e., x ∈ R.
To proceed, we first provide an upper bound of the optimal performance proved in Theorem 2,
u(δ), for any δ and any system models (instead of only homogeneous sensors).
Lemma 7. The optimal performance u(δ) in (14) is upper bounded:
u(δ) ≤ u¯(δ),
where u¯(δ) = δ2u¯(1) with u¯(1) being the optimal value of the following optimization prob-
lem:
minimize
x ∈ Rn, s ∈ Rm
1
2
m∑
i=1
(Hix+ si)
2/Wi
subject to ‖s‖0 ≤ 2q,
‖x‖2 = 1.
(26)
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Proof. See Appendix G.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the case where sensors are homogeneous and
the system is scalar. Then without loss of generality, we let Hi = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. We
define the estimator f trm be the “trimmed mean”, i.e.,
f trm (Y (k)) = trm (avg(Y (k))) , (27)
where for any y ∈ Rm,
trm(y) ,
1
m− 2q
m−q∑
i=q+1
y[i] (28)
with y[i] being the i-th smallest element. In other words, trm(y) first discards the largest q and
smallest q elements of y, and then averages over the remaining ones.
We show that the trimmed mean estimator f trm is uniformly optimal in Theorem 4. The
theorem is proved by showing that f trm achieves the upper bound in Lemma 7 for every δ,
which, in turn, means that the upper bound is tight when homogeneous sensors are considered.
Theorem 4. When the sensors are homogeneous (and thus the system state is scalar), f trm
in (27) is uniformly optimal, i.e.,
r(f trm, δ) = u(δ)
holds for every δ.
Proof. See Appendix H.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Illustration of X (y, φ) and rad(X (y, φ))
We illustrate how X (y, φ) and rad(X (y, φ)) vary with φ in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively.
The parameters used are summarized as follows: m = 4 sensors used to estimate x ∈ R2, q = 1
sensor might be manipulated, measurement matrix H = [1, 0; 0, 1; 1, 2; 2, 1], covariance matrix
W = diag(1, 2, 2, 1), and observation y = [4;−4; 5;−5]. Let res[i] be the i-th item of the set
{res(I) : I ⊆ M, |I| = m − q} sorted in an ascending order. Then we have, in our case, that
res[1] = 3.68182, res[2] = 5.78571, res[3] = 13.5, res[4] = 24.3.
From Fig. 2, one sees that X (y, φ) is indeed a union of several ellipses. One also sees in
Fig. 3 that rad(X (y, φ)) is strictly increasing w.r.t. φ when rad(X (y, φ)) > 0, and discontinuous
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only at res[2] and res[3], which verifies Lemma 6. Notice also that as φ crosses res[4] from below,
the new ellipse, which is indicated by the red one in the right-below sub-figure of Fig. 2, is
inside the blue dashed circle that covers the previous three ellipses. Therefore, rad(X (y, φ)) is
continuous at φ = res[4].
3 4 5 6
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0
1
φ = 4
−5 0 5 10
−10
−5
0
5
φ = 7
−10 −5 0 5 10
−15
−10
−5
0
5
φ = 13.7
−10 0 10
−20
−10
0
10
φ = 25
Fig. 2: The set X (y, φ) with different φ’s. In each of the four sub-figures, x-axis is x1 and y-axis
x2. The filled area corresponds to X (y, φ). The blue “*” is the Chebyshev center of X (y, φ),
and blue dashed line the circle centered at the Chebyshev center with radius rad(X (y, φ)).
B. Resilience of the Proposed Estimator
In the following, in order to verify the intuitive comments of Remark 5 about the resilience
of f ∗δ (11), we use a numerical example to show how the output of f
∗
δ varies with the injected
bias and δ. The parameters used are summarized as follows: m = 4 sensors used to estimate
x ∈ R2, measurement matrix H = [1, 0; 0, 1; 1, 2; 2, 1], covariance matrix W = diag(1, 2, 2, 1),
and observation z = [1; 1; 3; 3]. We let the fourth sensor be attacked, i.e., the first three elements
of y are [1; 1; 3] and y4 = z4 + a. In particular, we let a vary from 0 to 15. We simulate our
estimator f ∗δ for two different error thresholds δ = 1, 3, and further compare it to the least squares
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Fig. 3: Radius rad(X (y, φ)) as a function of φ.
estimator, which computes the estimate as (H⊤W−1H)−1H⊤W−1y. When using Algorithm 1,
we let the performance error tolerance ε = 0.001.
The result is illustrated in Fig. 4. One sees that when the bias injected a is too large, the
estimation error of our algorithm is zero, i.e., the attack effects are eliminated. This is consistent
with intuitive comments in Remark 5. Furthermore, when using a smaller δ (i.e., δ = 1 in our
example), the estimator tends to discard the injected bias: the zero-error range is a ∈ [3,∞] for
δ = 1, which is contrasted with [8,∞] for δ = 3. This is because given the same observation y,
smaller δ is, smaller φ and, thus, the collection I(φ) are, which means that the “abnormal” data
(with large res(I)) will be more likely to be discarded. It is clear that the naive least squares
estimator is not resilient to the attack.
C. Comparison with Other Estimators
In this section, we compare our estimator with the LASSO. In our case, given avg(Y (k)) =
y ∈ Rm, the LASSO reads
minimize
x∈Rn,a∈Rm
‖(W /k)−1/2(y −Hx− a)‖2 + λ‖a‖1, (29)
where λ is predefined parameter and the optimal solution x is the estimate. Basically, the smaller
λ is, the securer is LASSO. Therefore, in our simulation, we set λ = 10−3. Notice that the l0
and l1-based state estimation procedures [6], [7] works in systems without noises or with (small)
bounded measurement noises, while the estimator in [8] (i.e., Algorithm 2 thereof) is undecided
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Fig. 4: 2-norm of estimation error as a function of the bias injected. Our algorithm with different
δ and the least squares estimator are compared.
for (many) certain observations, that is, it can happen that no subset of sensors are deemed
as attack free and, therefore, no output will be generated. We should also note that while [9]
proves the resilience of LASSO when each sensor is observable, i.e., Hi is scalar in our case, the
LASSO under sparse attack is not resilient in general; see [18]. Therefore, we consider scalar
state in this simulation and for simplicity, we further assume the sensors are homogeneous.
We assume there are totally m = 5 sensors, of which q = 1 sensor is compromised. We
let measurement matrix H = [1; 1; 1; 1; 1] and covariance matrix W = diag(1, 1, 1, 1, 1). When
computing the worst-case probability e(f, k, δ) in (3), we assume that, without loss of generality,
the true state is x = 0 and the fifth sensor compromised. We then simulate the error probability
for a fixed y5 with y = avg(Y (k)) being the averaged measurement, the maximum of which
is then regarded as the worst-case probability e(f, k, δ). From Fig. 5, one sees that for either
δ = 1 or δ = 1.5, the performances of f trm and f ∗δ are quite close, which is consistent with the
uniform optimality of f trm stated in Theorem 4. One should also note that both f trm and f ∗δ
outperform the LASSO.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we provided a different perspective on secure static state estimation with
Byzantine sensors by introducing a new probabilistic performance metric, i.e., the decaying
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Fig. 5: Worst-case probability e(f, k, δ) in (3) as a function of estimator f (our proposed estimator
f ∗δ in Algorithm 1, trimmed mean estimator f
trm in (27), and LASSO in (29)), time k (1, 5, 10),
and error threshold δ (1, 1.5).
rate of the worst-case probability that the estimation error is larger than some value δ rather
than the worst-case error or estimation error covariance in the existing literature. This new metric
does not necessarily require bounded noise. With this metric, we gave an optimal estimator for
any given error threshold δ, which is the Chebyshev center of a certain set, and proposed an
algorithm to compute it. A significant byproduct is that if distribution of the observation noise
is in the exponential family, the sufficient statistic for the underlying state remains the same
whether or not the attacker is present. When the sensors are homogeneous, we further derived
a simple yet uniformly optimal estimator, which, to be specific, is the trimmed mean of the
averaged observations and simultaneously optimal for every δ.
For the future work, there are two interesting directions. One is to extend the existing results
into dynamic systems, while the other one is to investigate the uniformly optimal estimator when
sensors are heterogeneous.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
The proof is of constructive nature and mainly stems from the fact that avg(Z(k)) is a sufficient
statistic for the underlying state x, where Z(k) is the “true“ measurement matrix when there
are no attacks and is defined in the same manner with Y (k).
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In the following, for simplicity of presentation, we do not distinguish the probability density
function (pdf) for a continuous random variable and probability mass function (pmf) for a discrete
one. Therefore, in some cases the summation is actually needed though we use integration
universally.
For any f ∈ F , we let f ′ satisfy (30) and (31). For any y ∈ Rm, Borel set A ⊆ Rn, and time
k,
Pf ′(xˆk ∈ A| avg(Y (k)) = y)
=
∫
Y ∈Rm×k
Pf(xˆk ∈ A|Y (k) = Y )
dP(Z(k) = Y | avg(Z(k)) = y). (30)
The above equation is the integral of Pf(·) over Y ∈ Rm×k with respect to the conditional
probability measure P(Z(k)| avg(Z(k)) = y). Notice that this conditional probability measure
P(Z(k)| avg(Z(k)) = y) is well-defined since avg(Z(k)) is a sufficient statistic of the “true”
measurements Z(k) for the underlying state x, i.e., for any state x,
Px(Z(k)| avg(Z(k)) = y) = P(Z(k)| avg(Z(k)) = y),
where Px(·) denotes the probability measure governing the original measurements Z(k) when
the state x is given. Notice that RHS of (30) can be interpreted as “taking expectation” of the
conditional probability measure Pf(xˆk|Y (k)) given that avg(Y (k)) = y and that Y (k) shares
the same distribution with Z(k).
Furthermore, let f ′ be in Fc, i.e.,
Pf ′(xˆk ∈ A|Y (k)) = Pf ′(xˆk ∈ A|Y
′(k)) (31)
for any Borel set A ⊆ Rn whenever avg(Y (k)) = avg(Y ′(k)).
Let Bδ(x) denote the closed ball centered at x ∈ Rn with radius δ > 0:
Bδ(x) , {y ∈ R
n : ‖y − x‖2 ≤ δ}. (32)
Regarding with f and f ′, in the remainder of this proof we devote ourselves to showing that
the following inequality holds for any state x, set C, δ > 0 and time k:
sup
g∈G
Pf,g,x,C (xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x)) ≥ sup
g∈G
Pf ′,g,x,C (xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x)) , (33)
from which Lemma 1 follows straightforwardly.
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We first identify the most harmful attack strategy for a generic f . Given state x, set C, δ > 0,
time k, and estimator f , consider the following optimization problem:
max
Y2∈Rq×k
∫
Y1∈R(m−q)×k
Pf
(
xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x)
∣∣∣Y (k)M\C = Y1,
Y (k)C = Y2
)
dPx(Z(k)M\C = Y1). (34)
Denote its optimal solution (i.e., the “manipulated matrix”) as mm(f, x, C, δ, k). Then one may
see that changing the measurements of the compromised sensors available at time k, Y (k)C , to
mm(f, x, C, δ, k) would maximize the error2 probability under estimator f . The optimal value of
the optimization problem (34) is just the worst-case error probability supg∈G Pf,g,x,C (xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x)).
We then identify the most harmful attack strategy for the compressed estimator f ′. Given state
x, set C, δ > 0, time k, and estimator f ′, consider the following optimization problem:
max
y2∈Rq
∫
y1∈Rm−q
Pf ′
(
xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x)
∣∣∣ avg(Y (k))M\C = y1,
avg(Y (k))C = y2
)
dPx(avg(Z(k))M\C = y1). (35)
Denote its optimal solution (i.e., the “manipulated vector”) as mv(f ′, x, C, δ, k). One may verify
that changing the measurements of the compromised sensors available at time k such that
avg(Z(k))C = mv(f
′, x, C, δ, k) would maximize the error probability under estimator f ′. The
optimal value of the optimization problem (35) is just the worst-case error probability supg∈G Pf ′,g,x,C (xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x)).
For the sake of better presentation, in the remainder of this proof, for any matrix M , we
rewrite MM\C as M[1] and MC as M[2]. We also omit the time index k of Z(k) and Y (k).
The set Bδ(x) is denoted by B. Notice that the “true” measurements Z are independent across
sensors given the underlying state x. Therefore, we can rewrite (30) as follows:
Pf ′(xˆk ∈ A| avg(Y ) = y)
=
∫
Rq×k
∫
R(m−q)×k
Pf(xˆk ∈ A|Y[1] = Y[1],Y[2] = Y[2])
dP(Z[1] = Y[1]| avg(Z[1]) = y[1])
dP(Z[2] = Y[2]| avg(Z[2]) = y[2]).
2For the sake of presentation, we call the event xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x) an error.
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Then one obtains that
sup
g∈G
Pf ′,g,x,C (xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x))
=
∫
Rm−q
∫
R(m−q)×k
∫
Rq×k
Pf(xˆk 6∈ B|Y[1] = Y[1],Y[2] = Y[2])
dP(Z[2] = Y[2]| avg(Z[2]) = mv(f
′, x, C, δ, k))
dP(Z[1] = Y[1]| avg(Z[1]) = z[1])
dPx(avg(Z[1]) = z[1])
=
∫
R(m−q)×k
∫
Rq×k
Pf(xˆk 6∈ B|Y[1] = Y[1],Y[2] = Y[2])
dP(Z[2] = Y[2]| avg(Z[2]) = mv(f
′, x, C, δ, k))
dPx(Z[1] = Y[1])
=
∫
Rq×k
∫
R(m−q)×k
Pf(xˆk 6∈ B|Y[1] = Y[1],Y[2] = Y[2])
dPx(Z[1] = Y[1])
dP(Z[2] = Y[2]| avg(Z[2]) = mv(f
′, x, C, δ, k))
≤ max
Y[2]∈Rq×k
∫
R(m−q)×k
Pf(xˆk 6∈ B|Y[1] = Y[1],Y[2] = Y[2])
dPx(Z[1] = Y[1])
= sup
g∈G
Pf,g,x,C (xˆk 6∈ Bδ(x)) ,
where the second equality follows from the law of total probability, and the inequality holds
because P(Z[2]| avg(Z[2]) = y[2]) is a probability measure for any y[2], i.e.,∫
Rq×k
dP(Z[2] = Y[2]| avg(Z[2]) = y[2]) = 1
for any y[2]. The proof is thus complete.
In order for readers to have a better picture of relationship between the main results obtained
in this paper (e.g., Theorems 1 and 2) and the assumptions posed in Section II, in particular,
Assumptions 1 and 4, in the following remark, we explain in detail how these assumptions are
utilized to derive (34).
Remark 6. Due to Assumption 1, one could split the sensors into two groups: “good” ones in
M\C and “bad” ones in C. All the measurements from up to time k from good sensors are not
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manipulated and, thus, denoted by Z(k)M\C . The attacker can develop the term Px(Z(k)M\C =
Y1) since it knows the true state x and system parameters by Assumption 4. Furthermore, since
the attacker knows the estimator f and has unlimited memory, it is proper to obtain the most
harmful attack strategy by (34).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A. Preliminaries
In the following lemma, we bound the area where a random variable has a high probability
showing up.
Given any random variable y ∈ Rn, we shall say that a point x is δ-typical, if
P(y ∈ Bδ(x)) > n/(n+ 1), (36)
where Bδ(x) is the closed ball defined in (32). In other words, y has a high probability lying in
the δ-neighborhood of x.
Let Tδ(y) denote the set of all δ-typical point x w.r.t. a random variable y, i.e.,
Tδ(y) , {x ∈ R
n : x is δ-typical w.r.t. y}. (37)
We have the following lemma to show that Tδ(y) lies in a ball with radius δ:
Lemma 8. For any random variable y ∈ Rn, there exists x∗ ∈ Rn such that
Tδ(y) ⊆ Bδ(x
∗). (38)
To proceed, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 9. Let A1, . . . ,An be n random events with the same underlying probability space, then
it holds that
P(∩nj=1Aj) ≥
n∑
j=1
P(Aj)− n+ 1. (39)
Proof of Lemma 9.
P(∩nj=1Aj) = 1− P(∪
n
j=1A
c
j) ≥ 1−
n∑
j=1
P(Acj)
= 1−
n∑
j=1
(1− P(Aj)) =
n∑
j=1
P(Aj)− n+ 1,
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where Ac is the complement of set A. The proof is thus complete.
Proof of Lemma 8. If Tδ(y) is empty, then obviously Tδ(y) = ∅ ⊂ Bδ(0).
If Tδ(y) only contains j ≤ (n+1) elements, say, x1, . . . , xj . Then Lemma 9 together with (36)
yields that
P(y ∈ ∩ji=1Bδ(xi)) > j ×
n
n+ 1
− j + 1 ≥ 0,
which means that the set ∩ji=1Bδ(xi) is not empty. Then Tδ(y) ⊆ Bδ(x
∗) for some x∗ ∈
∩ji=1Bδ(xi).
If Tδ(y) contains j > (n + 1) elements (j might be infinite). Then again by Lemma 9, one
obtains that for any n+ 1 elements, say, x1, . . . , xn+1, there holds
P(y ∈ ∩n+1i=1 Bδ(xi)) > 0,
that is, ∩n+1i=1 Bδ(xi) 6= ∅. Since Bδ(x) is compact and convex for any x, then Helly’s theorem [33]
means that
∩x∈Tδ(y)Bδ(x) 6= ∅.
Then Tδ(y) ⊆ Bδ(x∗) for some x∗ ∈ ∩x∈Tδ(y)Bδ(x). The proof is thus complete.
Definition 5. Any point x∗ ∈ Rn is said to be a δ-center of a random variable y ∈ Rn if it is
such that (38) holds.
The following follows readily from Lemma 8.
Lemma 10. If x∗ ∈ Rn is a δ-center of a random variable y ∈ Rn, then for any x ∈ Rn:
1− 1Bδ(x)(x
∗) ≤ (n + 1)P(y /∈ Bδ(x)). (40)
B. Main Body
Consider any estimator f ∈ F , we construct a deterministic one f ′ ∈ Fd: for any time k and
observations Y (k), let f ′k(Y (k)) be a δ-center of the random variable fk(Y (k)), the existence
of which is guaranteed by Lemma 8.
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Hence, for any attack strategy g, true state x, set of compromised sensors C, and time k, we
have
Pf ′,g,x,C(‖xˆk − x‖ > δ)
=
∫
Y ∈Rm×k
1− 1Bδ(x)(f
′
k(Y )) dPg,x,C(Y (k) = Y )
≤
∫
Y ∈Rm×k
(n+ 1)P(fk(Y ) /∈ Bδ(x)) dPg,x,C(Y (k) = Y )
=(n + 1)Pf,g,x,C(‖xˆ(k)− x‖ > δ),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 10, and Pg,x,C(·) denotes the probability measure
governing Y (k) when g, x, C are given. Then it is clear that
e(f, k, δ) ≥ e(f ′, k, δ)/(n+ 1). (41)
Recall that e(f, k, δ) is the worst-case probability defined in (3). Then it follows that for any
δ > 0:
r(f, δ) = lim inf
k→∞
−
log e(f, k, δ)
k
≤ lim inf
k→∞
−
log e(f ′, k, δ)/(n+ 1)
k
= lim inf
k→∞
−
log e(f ′, k, δ)
k
(42)
=r(f ′, δ).
The proof is thus complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Consider a compressed but possibly random estimator f ∈ Fc, we construct a deterministic
one f ′ ∈ Fcd satisfying:
• for any time k and observations Y (k), f ′(Y (k)) is a δ-center of the random variable
f(Y (k));
• f ′(Y (k)) = f ′(Y ′(k)) if avg(Y (k)) = avg(Y ′(k)).
The existence of f ′ is guaranteed by Lemma 8 and the fact that random variables f(Y (k)), f(Y ′(k))
have the same distribution if avg(Y (k)) = avg(Y ′(k)).
Then as in Appendix B, one obtains r(f, δ) ≤ r(f ′, δ), which, together with Lemma 1,
concludes the proof.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first prove that r(f, δ) is upper-bounded by u(δ) for any f ∈ F in Lemma 12. We then
show that r(f ∗δ , δ) = u(δ) in Lemma 13. Before proceeding, we need the following supporting
definitions and lemmas.
A. Supporting Definition and Lemmas
Lemma 11. For any A ⊆ Rn, if rad(A) > γ, there exists a set A0 ⊆ A such that |A0| ≤ n+1
and rad(A0) > γ.
Proof. If |A| ≤ n+1, then the lemma holds trivially by letting A0 = A. When |A| > n+1, we
prove the lemma by contradiction. Suppose for every subset A0 ⊆ A with |A0| ≤ n + 1, there
holds rad(A0) ≤ γ. Then we have
∩x∈A0Bγ(x) 6= ∅
for every A0 ⊆ A with |A0| = n + 1. Since Bγ(x) is compact and convex for every x ∈ A,
Helly’s theorem [33] implies that
∩x∈ABγ(x) 6= ∅.
Hence, for any x0 ∈ ∩x∈ABγ(x), A ⊆ Bγ(x0). Therefore rad(A) ≤ γ, which contradicts the
condition rad(A) > γ.
With a slight abuse of notation, we use the sequence of functions (f1(avg(Y(1))), f2(avg(Y(2))), . . .)
from time 1 to ∞ to denote a compressed and deterministic estimator f ∈ Fcd.
Definition 6. Given a compressed and deterministic estimator f ∈ Fcd, x ∈ Rn, δ > 0, and
time k, let Y(f, x, δ, k) be the set of averaged measurements avg(Y(k)) such that the estimate
xˆk lies outside the ball Bδ(x), i.e.,
Y(f, x, δ, k) , {y ∈ Rm : fk(y) 6∈ Bδ(x)}. (43)
B. Upper Bound
Lemma 12. For any estimator f ∈ F , there holds
r(f, δ) ≤ u(δ). (44)
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Proof. We show that r(f, δ) < u(δ) + ǫ for any ǫ > 0 and f ∈ F .
Given ǫ > 0, from the definition of u(δ), one obtains that there must exist y∗ ∈ Rm and a set
A ⊆ Rn such that:
1) dx(y
∗) ≤ u(δ) + ǫ/2 for all x ∈ A;
2) rad(A) > δ.
Notice that the above y∗ andA can be constructed as follows. By the definition of u(δ), there must
exist a y∗ such that for every x ∈ X(y∗, δ), dx(y∗) < u(δ) + ǫ/4 holds. Then we construct A by
cases. If rad(X(y∗, δ)) = δ, then there must exist φ∗ < u(δ)+ǫ/4 such that X (y∗, φ∗) = X(y∗, δ).
Let A = X (y∗, φ∗ + ǫ/4), and, therefore, A ⊂ X (y∗, u(δ) + ǫ/2). Also, by the third bullet of
Lemma 6, rad(A) > δ holds. If rad(X(y∗, δ)) < δ, then let φ∗ = min{φ : X(y∗, δ) ⊆ X (y∗, φ)}
and A = X (y∗, φ∗). Then by Lemma 6, rad(A) > δ and dx(y∗) ≤ u(δ) + ǫ/4 for all x ∈ A.
Lemma 11 yields that there exists A0 ⊆ A such that rad(A0) > δ and |A0| ≤ n + 1. Let
a∗(y, x) be the optimal solution to the optimization problem in (8) given y ∈ Rm and x ∈ Rn.
Since dx(y, I) in (16) is continuous w.r.t. y and |A0| ≤ n+1, then one obtains that there exists
a ball Bβ(y∗), where β > 0 is dependent on ǫ, such that dx(y,M\ supp(a∗(y∗, x))) < u(δ) + ǫ
for every x ∈ A0 and every y ∈ Bβ(y∗).
By Theorem 1, one suffices to consider a compressed and deterministic estimator f ∈ Fcd.
Furthermore, since rad(A0) > δ, one concludes that for every time k and f ∈ Fcd, there holds
Bβ(y
∗) ⊆ ∪x∈A0Y(f, x, δ, k). (45)
Let Ln(·) denote the Lebesgue measure on Rn. Because of countable additivity of Lebesgue
measure [34], one obtains that there must exist a point x∗ ∈ A0 such that
Lm(Bβ(y
∗) ∩ Y(f, x∗, δ, k)) ≥ Lm(Bβ(y
∗))/(n+ 1). (46)
For the sake of simplicity, let B(x∗, k) , Bβ(y∗) ∩ Y(f, x∗, δ, k) and I∗ , supp(a∗(y∗, x∗)).
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Then it is clear that
e(f, k, δ)
≥ sup
g∈G
Pg,x∗,I∗ (avg(Y(k)) ∈ Y(f, x
∗, δ, k))
≥ sup
g∈G
Pg,x∗,I∗ (avg(Y(k)) ∈ B(x
∗, k))
= sup
avg(Z(k))I∗∈R
q
Px∗ (avg(Z(k)) ∈ B(x
∗, k))
= sup
o∈Rq
Px∗
(
avg(Z(k))M\I∗ ∈ B(o, k)
)
, (47)
where B(o, k) with o ∈ Rq is the projected set of B(x∗, k):
B(o, k) , {yM\I∗ : y ∈ B(x
∗, k), yI∗ = o}.
Further let B(k) be a set that satisfies:
Lm−q(B(k)) = sup
o∈Rq
Lm−q(B(o, k)),
and for any υ > 0, there exists o ∈ Rq such that
Lm−q(B(k) \ B(o, k)) < υ.
Roughly speaking, B(k) can be viewed as the supremum set. Then one obtains that
sup
o∈Rq
Px∗
(
avg(Z(k))M\I∗ ∈ B(o, k)
)
≥ Px∗
(
avg(Z(k))M\I∗ ∈ B(k)
)
(48)
In the following, we focus on characterizing the term in (48). Let px∗(·) : Rm−q 7→ R+ be the
probability density of avg(Z(k))M\I∗ conditioned on the underlying state x
∗, i.e.,
px∗(z) = N (HM\I∗,W{M\I∗}/k, z),
where W = diag(Wi,W2, . . . ,Wm) is the diagonal matrix, W{M\I∗} (different from WM\I∗)
the square matrix obtained fromW after removing all of the rows and columns except those in
the index set M \ I∗, and N (µ,Σ,x) the probability density function of a Gaussian random
variable with mean µ and variance Σ taking value at x. Then one obtains that
Px∗
(
avg(Z(k))M\I∗ ∈ B(k)
)
=
∫
Rm−q
1B(k)(z)px∗(z)dz.
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From (46), some basic arguments mainly involving the regularity theorem for Lebesgue measure
and the Heine–Borel theorem [34] give that there exists γ > 0 such that
Lm−q(B(k)) > γLm−q(Bβ(y
∗)M\I∗). (49)
Furthermore, γ can be determined by m,n, q, and β, which is, in particular, irrelevant to time
k. Let Z(x∗, k) ⊆ Bβ(y∗)M\I∗ be the pre-image of (p, p¯) under the function px∗(·), where
p , minz∈Bβ(y∗)M\I∗ px∗(z) is the minimum value
3 and p¯ is such that
Lm−q(Z(x
∗, k)) = γLm−q(Bβ(y
∗)M\I∗). (50)
Notice that p¯ exists since Lm−q({z : px∗(z) = p}) = 0 for any p. Then one obtains that
Px∗
(
avg(Z(k))M\I∗ ∈ B(k)
)
≥Px∗
(
avg(Z(k))M\I∗ ∈ Z(x
∗, k)
)
. (51)
Notice that the pre-image of an open set under a continuous function is also open, Z(x∗, k) is
thus open. Furthermore, since both γ and Bβ(y∗) are independent of time k, Z(x∗, k) will be
an nonempty set whatever k is. Therefore, the following holds:
lim sup
k→∞
1
k
log Px∗
(
avg(Z(k))M\I∗ ∈ Z(x
∗, k)
)
≤ inf
z∈Z(x∗,k)
1
2
(z −HM\I∗x
∗)⊤
(
WM\I∗
)−1
(z −HM\I∗x
∗)
= inf
z∈Rm,zM\I∗∈Z(x
∗,k)
dx∗(y,M\ I
∗)
<u(δ) + ǫ, (52)
where first inequality is due to the Crame´r’s Theorem [35] and the fact that Z(x∗, k) is open
and dx∗(·,M\ I∗) is the corresponding rate function since the observation noise wi(k) is i.i.d.
across time and independent across the sensors; the last inequality follows from the definitions
of Z(x∗, k) and Bβ(y
∗). Then, combining with (47), (48) and (51), one concludes the proof.
C. Achievability
About the estimator f ∗δ defined in (11), we have the following lemma:
Lemma 13. There holds r(f ∗δ , δ) = u(δ).
3Notice that this minimum can be attained since px∗(z) is a continuous function and Bβ(y
∗)M\I∗ is compact.
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Proof. Notice that, by the definition of u(δ), for any x, δ and k, if y ∈ Y(f ∗δ , x, δ, k), then
dx(y) ≥ u(δ). Recall that Y(·, ·, ·, ·) is introduced in Definition 6. Let
Y∗(x) , {y : dx(y) ≥ u(δ)}.
Then Y(f ∗δ , x, δ, k) ⊆ Y
∗(x) holds. Therefore, for any k, x and I:
sup
g∈G
Pg,x,I (avg(Y(k)) ∈ Y(f
∗
δ , x, δ, k))
≤ sup
g∈G
Pg,x,I (avg(Y(k)) ∈ Y
∗(x))
≤Px
(
avg(Z(k))M\I ∈ Y
∗(x)M\I
)
.
Then similar to (52), by the Crame´r’s Theorem [35] and the fact that Y∗(x)M\I is closed, one
obtains that
lim inf
k→∞
1
k
logPx
(
avg(Z(k))M\I ∈ Y
∗(x)M\I
)
≥ inf
z∈Rm,zM\I∈Y∗(x)M\I
dx(z,M\ I)
= inf
z∈Y∗(x)
dx(z,M\ I)
≥ inf
z∈Y∗(x)
dx(z)
≥u(δ).
Since the above argument holds for any x and I, one concludes that r(f ∗δ , δ) ≥ u(δ). Furthermore,
r(f ∗δ , δ) is upper bounded by u(δ) due to Lemma 12, the proof is thus complete.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 12, one readily obtains the second bullet
of Lemma 3 from the first one. Therefore, we focus on the first bullet in the sequel.
The proof is of constructive nature. Since H is not 2q-observable, without loss of generality,
we let HI∗ is not of full column rank with I∗ = {2q+1, . . . , m}. For any δ, let x1, x2 ∈ Rn be
any two vectors such that
HI∗(x2 − x1) = 0, and ‖x2 − x1‖ > δ.
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Let I1 = {1, . . . , q} and I2 = {q + 1, . . . , 2q}. We then construct y
∗ as follows:
y∗I∗ = HI∗x1,
y∗I1 = HI1x1,
y∗I2 = HI2x2.
Then it is easy to verify that dx1(y
∗) = dx2(y
∗) = 0. The proof is thus complete.
APPENDIX F
PROOFS OF LEMMAS IN SECTION III-C
Proof of Lemma 4. For any index set I, there holds
dx(y, I) =
1
2
(yI −HIx)
⊤W−1{I}(yI −HIx)
=
1
2
(
√
W−1{I}yI −
√
W−1{I}HIx)
⊤
(
√
W−1{I}yI −
√
W−1{I}HIx),
which holds since W−1{I} is a diagonal matrix. For simplicity of notation, in the remainder of
this proof, we let yw =
√
W−1{I}yI and Hw =
√
W−1{I}HI . By orthogonally projecting yw onto
the range of Hw using HwH
+
w , where H
+
w is the pseudo-inverse of Hw, one obtains
dx(y, I) =
1
2
(yw −HwH
+
w yw +HwH
+
w yw −Hwx)
⊤
(yw −HwH
+
w yw +HwH
+
w yw −Hwx). (53)
Notice that (yw−HwH+w yw) is orthogonal to (HwH
+
w yw−Hwx). Furthermore, Wi > 0 for each
i, and by Assumption 3, HI is of full column rank for any I with |I| ≥ m − 2q, Hw is thus
full column rank and H+w = (H
⊤
wHw)
−1H⊤w . One then obtains (17) from (53). The proof is thus
complete.
Proof of Lemma 5. It follows readily from [36, Lemma 2.8] that a ball Bυ(c) ⊆ Rn covers a
full dimensional ellipsoid {x : (x− x0)⊤Q(x− x0) ≤ δ2}, where Q ∈ Rn×n is positive definite
and δ > 0, if and only if there exists τ ≥ 0 such that
τ


Q −Qx0 0
∗ x⊤0 Qx0 − δ
2 0
0 0 0

 <


In −c 0
−c⊤ −υ2 c⊤
0 c −In

 . (54)
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Also, it is clear that a ball Bυ(c) ⊆ R
n covers a point x ∈ Rn if and only if
(x− c)⊤(x− c) ≤ υ2,
which, by Schur complement, is equivalent to
υ2 (x− c)⊤
∗ In

 < 0. (55)
Furthermore, for any φ such that I(φ) is not empty, the set X (y, φ) is a union of some full
dimensional ellipsoids (when the set I+(φ) is not empty) and some single points (when the set
I0(φ) is not empty). Therefore, one can conclude Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 6. It holds that X (y, φ0) ⊆ X (y, φ1) for any y and φ0 ≤ φ1. Therefore,
rad(X (y, φ)) is monotonically increasing w.r.t. φ.
Let res[i] be the i-th item of the set {res(I) : I ⊆ M, |I| = m − q} sorted in an ascending
order. Then by viewing X (y, φ) as a union of ellipsoids as in (21), one obtains that for any φ0 ∈⋃(mq )−1
i=1
(
res[i], res[i+1]
)⋃(
res[(mq )]
,∞
)
, where (mq ) is the binomial coefficient, the following
holds:
lim
φ→φ0
X (y, φ) = X (y, φ0),
and for any φ0 ∈
⋃(mq )
i=1 res[i],
lim
φ→φ+0
X (y, φ) = X (y, φ0)
holds, where φ→ φ+0 means that |φ−φ0| → 0 and φ−φ0 > 0. Notice also that rad(X (y, φ)) = 0
for all φ ≤ res[1]. Therefore, one can conclude the first two bullets of Lemma 6.
By the first two bullets, in order to obtain the third one, it suffices to show that when φ is
in any of the (mq ) intervals
⋃(mq )−1
i=1
(
res[i], res[i+1]
)⋃(
res[(mq )]
,∞
)
, rad(X (y, φ)) is strictly
increasing w.r.t. φ. Notice that when φ is in any of these intervals, I0(φ) is empty and I+(φ)
remains the same, and, therefore, the optimal solution ψ∗ (i.e., the square of rad(X (y, φ))) to
the optimization problem in Lemma 5 is strictly increasing w.r.t. φ. The third bullet is thus
concluded and, therefore, the proof is complete.
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Let x∗, s∗ be the optimal solution to the optimization problem (26). Further let x ∈ Rn be any
vector and I0, I1 the two index sets such that I0 ∪ I1 = supp(s
∗), |I0| ≤ q, and |I1| ≤ q. We
then construct the following three quantities x0, x1 ∈ Rn and y∗ ∈ Rm:
x0 = x− δx
∗, x1 = x+ δx
∗, (56)
y∗M\supp(s∗) = (Hx)M\supp(s∗), (57)
y∗I0 = (Hx0)I0 , y
∗
I1 = (Hx1)I1 . (58)
Then one verifies that
‖x0 − x1‖2 = 2δ, (59)
dx0(y
∗) ≤ u¯(δ), (60)
dx1(y
∗) ≤ u¯(δ). (61)
Notice that (60) holds because by the definition of dx0(y
∗) (i.e., the optimal value of (8)), we
have
dx0(y
∗) ≤
1
2
m∑
i=1
(y∗i −Hix0 + ai)
2/Wi,
= u¯(δ)
where ai = −Hi(x1 − x0) for i ∈ I1 and ai = 0 for i ∈ M \ I1. The equation (61) can be
obtained in the same manner.
Therefore, x0, x1 ∈ X (y∗, u¯(δ)) by (60) and (61). Combining (59), one then obtains that
rad(X (y∗, u¯(δ))) ≥ δ. (62)
Notice that since u¯(δ) = δ2u¯(1), we have for any ǫ, δ > 0,
u¯(δ) + ǫ = u¯(δ′),
where δ′ = δ
√
(u¯(δ) + ǫ)/u¯(δ) > δ. Then using the same construction technique as in (56)-(58),
one concludes that, by (62), for any ǫ > 0, there exists y ∈ Rm such that
rad(X (y, u¯(δ) + ǫ)) = rad(X (y, u¯(δ′)))
≥ δ′ > δ.
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Therefore, from the definition of u(δ), one obtains that u(δ) ≤ u¯(δ) for any δ. The proof is thus
complete.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The proof is divided into two parts.
Part I. We show that for every y ∈ Rm,
dx(y) ≥ u¯(|x− trm(y)|) (63)
holds for every x ∈ R, where recall that u¯(δ) is the upper bound in Lemma 7.
Since the sensors are homogeneous, then without loss of generality, we let Wi = W/2 for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Then one obtains that
u¯(δ) = (m− 2q)δ2/W.
One further obtains that for any y ∈ Rm and x ∈ R,
dx(y) ≥
m−q∑
i=q+1
(y[i] − x)
2/W
≥ (m− 2q)(
1
m− 2q
m−q∑
i=q+1
y[i] − x)
2/W
= u¯(|x− trm(y)|).
Therefore, (63) holds.
Part II. Notice that, for any x, δ and k, if y ∈ Y(f trm, x, δ, k), |x − trm(y)| ≥ δ holds,
where Y(·, ·, ·, ·) is introduced in Definition 6. Then (63) yields that dx(y) ≥ u¯(δ) for every
y ∈ Y(f trm, x, δ, k).
Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 13, one obtains that for any δ,
r(f trm, δ) ≥ u¯(δ) ≥ u(δ).
Due to the optimality of u(δ), the above equation holds as equality. The proof is thus complete.
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